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Abstract—Ensuring that information flowing through a net-
work is secure from manipulation and eavesdropping by unau-
thorized parties is an important task for network administrators.
Many cyber attacks rely on a lack of network-level information
flow controls to successfully compromise a victim network. Once
an adversary exploits an initial entry point, they can eavesdrop
and move laterally within the network (e.g., scan and penetrate
internal nodes) to further their malicious goals. In this paper,
we propose a novel multilevel security (MLS) framework to
enforce a secure inter-node information flow policy within the
network and therein vastly reduce the attack surface available
to an adversary who has penetrated it. In contrast to prior
work on multilevel security in computer networks which relied
on enforcing the policy at network endpoints, we leverage the
centralization of software-defined networks (SDNs) by moving
the task to the controller and providing this service transparently
to all nodes in the network. Our framework, MLSNet, formalizes
the generation of a policy compliant network configuration (i.e.,
set of flow rules on the SDN switches) as network optimization
problems, with the objectives of (1) maximizing the number
of flows satisfying all security constraints and (2) minimizing
the security cost of routing any remaining flows to guarantee
availability. We demonstrate that MLSNet can securely route
flows that satisfy the security constraints (e.g., > 80% of flows
in a performed benchmark) and route the remaining flows with
a minimal security cost.
Index Terms—Software-defined networks, security services,
security management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring that information flowing through a network is
secure from manipulation and eavesdropping by unauthorized
parties is an important task for network administrators. Many
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attacks against modern networks rely on a lack of network-
level information flow controls to infiltrate an organizational
network. Here, adversaries initially subvert edge defenses to
target and compromise an internal node. Once inside the net-
work, the adversary can probe network nodes or eavesdrop on
flows to penetrate further into the network [1]. This adversary-
enabling freedom of movement and lack of secure routing (to
prevent eavesdropping) can be cast as a classical information
flow problem in security [2].
Even with defenses such as firewalls, information flow
control in networks often fails: configuration is error-prone [3],
and compromised internal hosts may initiate flows that never
have to cross a firewall boundary [4]. Thus, adversaries can
exploit firewall rule conflicts to exfiltrate information, and in-
ternal adversaries can eavesdrop and move laterally (i.e., scan
and penetrate internal nodes) within their network boundary
without restriction. Fundamentally, they are enabled by a lack
of security policy governing what flows are permitted and what
paths they may take in the network.
Multilevel security (MLS) provides the means to enforce
such a policy. A multilevel security framework controls infor-
mation flow among entities of different security classes with
security labels (i.e., levels and categories) assigned to those
entities. In fact, multilevel security already plays a critical role
in controlling access to information for both military personnel
and employees of commercial businesses with different levels
of clearance [5]. Common use cases include controlling file
access in an operating system [6] or table access in a relational
database [7]. The notion of multilevel security can also be
applied to computer networks, where the MLS policy dictates
which nodes are allowed to communicate, what type of traffic
they may exchange, and what paths the flows may take in
the network. This strategy can prevent eavesdropping and
unrestricted lateral movement that plague modern networks.
Lu et al. [8] envisioned such a model that enforces the
information flow policy at network endpoints; however, the
scale and dynamic behavior of modern networks make deploy-
ing such an enforcement mechanism on every endpoint im-
practical. Despite this, the inherent centralization of software-
defined networks (SDNs) allows enforcement of a network-
level MLS policy in a scalable and efficient manner. Deter-
mination of whether or not flows are permitted can be done
by the controller, and the policy can be enforced by the data-
plane switches in the form of flow rules—which allows the
service to be provided transparently to the entire network.
Thus, in this paper, we propose an SDN-based MLS frame-
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TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE AND NOTATION.
Notation Description
V Set of vertices in network graph G = {V,E}
E Set of edges in network graph G = {V,E}
F Set of packet flows to be accommodated
R Set of matching fields in a flow rule
A Set of action fields in a flow rule
S Set of subjects
O Set of objects
C Set of security categories
df Size of flow f ∈ F
κij (κ˜ij) Residual capacity of link (i, j), (i, j) ∈ E
σi Security level of node i, i ∈ V
λci Security category c at node i
L Set of labels that form the lattice
work to enforce an inter-node information flow policy that
preserves confidentiality. The challenge here is to fit the or-
ganizational needs by allowing entities to exchange permitted
flows while also configuring the network (by leveraging flow
rules) to be policy compliant. Permitted flows between two
endpoints may not always find a secure path due to limited
network resources (e.g., link capacity). Then, to guarantee
availability, a flow may have to be routed through an insecure
path. We refer to such a situation as a policy conflict, and each
conflict imposes a security cost in terms of the risk the flow
is being exposed to.
Unlike prior work [8], we approach the challenge of se-
curing information flow in the network by considering two
optimization models: one that can provide a secure network
configuration (i.e., composition of flows rules) that obeys the
security policy, supplemented by a model that can minimally
relax the security policy to ensure that every flow can be
routed. The key contributions are:
• An optimization model to maximize the number of flows
routed according to the given security policy in an SDN.
• An optimization model to minimize the security cost of
routing any remaining flows to guarantee availability.
• A method for constructing flow rules which adhere to a
given security policy.
• A comprehensive evaluation of MLSNet’s ability to gen-
erate policy compliant network configurations and resolve
policy conflicts in realistic network topologies.
II. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we extend prior work’s [8] terms and
notations (Table I) to an SDN setting and provide background
on related network security threats and defenses, and MLS.
A. Term Definitions
Node. A resource connected to a network (e.g., a user, server,
router, or SDN switch).
Subject. A node that initiates communication to other nodes
Fig. 1. Corporate network scenario.
in the network.
Object. A node that either provides (provider) and/or receives
(receiver) information to/from subjects
Forwarding Node. A node (SDN switch) that processes
incoming flows according to the installed flow rules.
Controller. An application in the SDN control plane that
has a global view of the topology and installs flow rules to
forwarding nodes based on the security policy.
Security Levels. Hierarchical attributes (e.g., top-secret, pub-
lic) that indicate relative authorization power.
Security Categories. Non-hierarchical attributes (e.g., TCP,
IP) that offer finer-grained authorization besides the security
level. In MLSNet, security categories are only assigned to
objects and subjects but not forwarding nodes.
Security Label. The security level and categories combined,
used by the controller to admit or deny flows.
B. Network Threats to Confidentiality
Confidentiality ensures that information is only being ac-
cessed by authorized parties. In the context of networking,
preserving confidentiality means that only explicitly allowed
communication can flow between any two nodes in the net-
work to prevent data from falling into the hands of untrusted
entities. A lack of a formal communication policy to realize
this may allow adversaries who have compromised internal
nodes to explore the network or eavesdrop on flows. For
example, in Figure 1, a compromised trusted node in the
software center may be able to probe other nodes in the
software and commercial centers as they are all behind the
same firewall boundary; the firewall itself cannot prevent the
adversary from probing all nodes on TCP port 22. Indeed, this
is possible regardless of the (implicit) security level of the
nodes; however, we can reduce attacker capabilities (enforce
least-privilege) with multilevel security.
Recent work has demonstrated the ability of an adversary
to freely probe within their network boundary to recover
sensitive information about the network [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13], including active network hosts and even switch flow table
rules [14]. We observe that although discovered attacks on
networks in the literature pursue different goals, the strategies
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TABLE II
DEFENSES AGAINST DISCUSSED ATTACK TECHNIQUES.
MLSNet [19] [4] [21]
Packet spoofing × × - -
Lateral movement × - × -
Man-in-the-middle × - - ×
of those posing a threat to confidentiality can be reduced to a
small set of techniques.
Packet Spoofing. Spoofing packets is the most common
technique. By spoofing, adversaries may be able to imperson-
ate other nodes to escalate privilege [15] or leak information
to untrustworthy nodes or outside of the network [16].
Lateral Movement. Adversaries can also move laterally by
probing many other nodes in the network. This nonessential
communication may allow them to extract sensitive informa-
tion from nodes of higher security levels or compromise nodes
and escalate privilege to move deeper into the network [14].
Man-in-the-Middle. Adversaries can also position them-
selves as a man-in-the-middle (MiTM), silently eavesdropping
on communications traversing them or within their broadcast
domain [17], [18].
C. Proposed Defenses
Although there have been defenses proposed against some
of the discussed attack techniques, they are limited in their
ability to preserve confidentiality.
Source validation. To address the issue of packet spoofing,
source validation seeks to only permit packets into a network
which’s source IP is valid on the given network interface. This
is typically implemented via ingress filtering [19] in wide-area
networks; however, it is difficult to implement, especially in
data-center networks [20], and does not prevent adversaries
from spoofing nodes within their own subnetwork.
Firewalling. The primary purpose of a firewall is to prevent
unauthorized packets from entering a network or subnetwork.
However, firewalling is limited with respect to preventing
lateral movement as configuration is error-prone [3], and com-
promised internal hosts can still probe within their network
boundary [4] to compromise internal nodes.
Encryption. Active man-in-the-middle attacks (i.e., those
staged by spoofing) may be mitigated with source validation;
however, preventing passive MiTM (eavesdroppers) is difficult.
Even with services such as encryption, adversaries can still
perform traffic analysis to extract sensitive information [21].
D. Preserving Confidentiality with Multilevel Security
Broadly speaking, existing defenses solve distinct problems
and only partially address the issue of confidentiality. Adver-
saries are enabled by a lack of policy preventing them from
probing network nodes and eavesdropping on communications.
What is needed are means to specify what flows are permitted
and what paths they may take in the network.
MLS. A multi-level security policy provides the means to
prevent these problems with a secure flow model between en-
tities that are assigned specific security labels (i.e., a level and
categories). The security labels form a lattice structure, which
reflects a hierarchical ordering of their relative authorization
power. We consider a node’s label to be higher than another
node’s if the former’s level is greater than or equal to, and
the categories form a superset of, the latter’s. With respect to
confidentiality, information should only flow to nodes with the
same or higher security label to prevent the potential leakage
of sensitive data to nodes of lower security labels. This is
typically summarized as ”no read up, no write down”.
Network MLS. Multilevel security already plays a critical
role in controlling access to files and databases in military
and commercial business contexts [5], [6], [7]. This notion
can also be applied to computer networks to prevent the
eavesdropping and unrestricted lateral movement that plague
modern networks. For example, nodes with lower security
levels should not be able to probe or communicate with nodes
of higher levels on specific TCP ports, and sensitive (e.g., top-
secret) flows should not traverse a node of lower security level.
In this context, for communication to be permitted and routed
between two nodes, both nodes and any intermediate nodes
must adhere to the ”no read up, no write down” policy.
Lu et al. [8] envisioned such an MLS model that enforces
the information flow policy at network endpoints. The problem
with this approach is that the scale and dynamic behavior
of modern networks make deploying such an enforcement
mechanism on every endpoint impractical. However, the inher-
ent centralization of software-defined networks (SDNs) allows
enforcement of a network-level MLS policy in a scalable
and efficient manner. Determination of whether or not flows
are permitted can be done by the controller, and the policy
can be enforced by the data-plane switches in the form of
flow rules. This offers the significant advantage over previous
work of allowing the service to be provided transparently to
the entire network, because network devices do not have to
run specialized software. The controller’s global view of the
network also offers greater flexibility as changes to labels and
policy can be reflected by simple changes to flow rules, as
opposed to manually re-configuring individual devices.
Ultimately, multilevel security can ensure that the network
achieves (to the degree possible) least-privilege isolation,
where only explicitly allowed communication can flow within
the network and must flow through secure paths. Hence,
it provides for maximal isolation from unauthorized parties
and therefore the smallest possible threat surface. Here, we
can mitigate lateral movement (by enforcing least-privilege),
eavesdropping (with secure routing paths), and packet spoof-
ing (blocking unknown sources) by unauthorized entities—a
significant improvement over prior work (see Table II). We
note that compromised nodes may still be able to probe or
eavesdrop nodes for which they have sufficient security level
and categories; however, their capabilities are significantly
restricted to only that allowed by policy, and they can quickly
be quarantined (via flow rules) upon detection.
III. MLSNET OVERVIEW
In this section, we present our threat model, lattice of
security labels, and policy constraints for MLSNet.
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A. Threat Model and Assumptions
For the assignment of security labels, we assume a Network
Security Officer (NSO), as defined by Lu et al. [8], who assigns
appropriate security labels (i.e., levels and categories) to the
network entities (e.g., endpoint devices and forwarding nodes).
The assignment can be done by leveraging the controller
as it has a global view of the network, and it must be
based on a security assessment of the entities in the network.
For example, endpoints with unpatched operating systems
should be assigned a lower security level, as they are more
likely to contain vulnerabilities than others with the latest
software updates. IoT devices or forwarding nodes connected
to third-party networks can also be considered less secure,
and therefore should be assigned a lower security level and a
restricted set of categories. In contrast, endpoints containing
more sensitive (e.g., top-secret) data should have a higher
security level assigned since information flow to nodes with
lower levels should be prevented.
MLSNet aims to protect confidentiality by preventing leak-
age to unauthorized entities. We assume that nodes connected
to a network may become compromised and have malicious
intentions. In this scenario, we aim to limit an adversary’s
ability to further compromise the network.
Additionally, we assume the controller has an accurate view
of the topology (i.e., nodes have not been spoofed). MLS
cannot detect all forms of packet spoofing, and we rely on
other SDN-based defenses to detect packet spoofing against
the topology discovery service [9].
B. Multilevel Security Lattices for Computer Networks
To compute an SDN-based network configuration (set of
flow rules installed to SDN switches) that satisfies the security
policy, we must first consider security levels and categories. As
drawn from Denning [2], we order the security levels used in
our model according to the following: TopSecret (4) > Secret
(3) > Confidential (2) > Public (1). For an SDN, we define
the security categories as the packet types supported by the
OpenFlow [22] protocol for matching incoming packets to
flow rules: TCP, ICMP, etc. Although, any number of levels
and categories can be defined to separate classes of flows; we
just use the above descriptions as one example for evaluation.
The combination of a level and one or more categories
then forms the label at a node. These labels form a lattice,
a partially ordered set that reflects the secrecy and privilege
requirements of communication in the network. We consider
a node’s label to be higher than another node’s if the former’s
level is greater than or equal to, and the categories form a
superset of, the latter’s. This can be seen in the sample lattice
shown in Figure 2. We note that this construction may lead to
incomparable labels, where neither label is a subset/superset
of the other, in which case communication would be denied by
default. This will preserve confidentiality but with the caveat
that not every flow may be accommodated.
Given the labels, the controller will install flow rules to the
SDN switches to allow communication only if the security
constraints are satisfied.
Fig. 2. OpenFlow specific security lattice for networks used in our evaluations
C. Security Policy Constraints
In this section, we discuss the access control and flow
control constraints, which form the basis of our security policy.
Access Control. As the first step to compute a security pol-
icy compliant network configuration, we determine if a subject
(e.g., user or process) initiating communication with an object
(e.g., file or resource) is allowed to exchange information with
the object based on the security levels and categories. To define
the constraints for access control, we have to consider if the
subject is communicating with a receiver object (i.e., object
receives from subject) or a provider object (i.e., subject sends
to object). If the subject communicates with a provider object,
then information flows from object o to subject s; inversely, if
object o is a receiver object, then information flows from s to o.
In case the object is both a provider and receiver object at the
same time, information flow between s and o is bidirectional.
Considering these three cases, given security level σ and
categories C of subject s and object o, the authorized informa-
tion flows are defined by a conventional MLS confidentiality
model [23]. For a subject s (e.g., workstation user) communi-
cating with a provider object o, (e.g., mail server in the DMZ
in Figure 1), the following constraint must be satisfied:
σo ≤ σs and Co ⊆ Cs,∀o ∈ O, s ∈ S (1)
Secondly, for a subject s (e.g., Wi-Fi client) communicating
with a receiver object o (e.g., network printer), the following
constraint must be satisfied:
σo ≥ σs and Co ⊇ Cs,∀o ∈ O, s ∈ S (2)
And for a subject s (e.g., workstation user) communicating
with an object o that is both a provider and receiver (e.g., git
repository), the following constraint must be satisfied:
σo = σs and Co = Cs,∀o ∈ O, s ∈ S (3)
Upon the initial arrival of a flow at the SDN controller from
a subject, it can be determined if the subject s is allowed
to exchange information with object o by considering the
access control constraints. While we define our framework
in a general way, security levels and categories are defined
specific to SDNs, as discussed in Section III-B.
Flow Control. If the access control constraints are satisfied,
information is allowed to flow between object o and subject s.
The next step before rule installation is for the controller to de-
termine whether there exists a path between o and s such that
the security level of any forwarding node on the path between o
and s is not lower than that of the flow. In Figure 1, the security
level of the switch connecting the publicly accessible Wi-Fi
to the network is lower compared to the switches connected
with the secure VPN, which are behind firewalls and only for
internal users. Traversing lower classified nodes puts a flow at
risk of being leaked to untrustworthy entities, being modified,
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or otherwise disrupted. Thus, protection of confidentiality is
constrained by secure path selection, and MLSNet will choose
an optimal path (if one exists) that satisfies this constraint for
any candidate flow.
We can formulate such a constraint by stating that the
security level σ of a node j on the path between o and s
cannot be lower than the security level of the originating node
of the flow. As with the access control constraint, we have to
take into account whether a subject is communicating with a
provider object, a receiver object, or an object that is both. If
the subject is communicating with a provider object, then the
following constraint must be satisfied:
σo ≤ σj ,∀j ∈ V on path (o, s) for flow f ∈ F (4)
Secondly, if the subject is communicating with a receiver
object, then traffic is flowing from the subject toward the
object, and the following constraint must be satisfied:
σs ≤ σj ,∀j ∈ V on path (o, s) for flow f ∈ F (5)
Lastly, the access control constraint for communicating with
an object that is a receiver and provider at the same time
defines that s and o are required to have the same security
level as stated in (3). Therefore, the flow control for such a
case requires a forwarder node to have a security level that is
higher or equal compared to the level of s and o:
(σs, σo) ≤ σj ,∀j ∈ V on path (o, s) for flow f ∈ F (6)
In addition to the security labels, we also must consider the
capacity κij of a link (i, j) on a path between s and o for a flow
with a size of df : κij ≥ df∀(i, j) on path (o, s). As a trade-
off for providing flow control, policy compliant paths may be
longer than a shortest available path which does not consider
a security policy. Additionally, in case two nodes satisfy the
the access control constraint, there is no guarantee that a path
between the nodes can be found which fulfills the flow control
constraint. If such, there may be a path traversing nodes which
do not have a high enough security label. We refer to such
cases as policy conflicts. In Section IV-C, we present a model
to minimize policy conflicts on flow paths. In short, it will find
the best fitting configuration and report the exact locations on
paths where policy conflicts exist. By deploying additional
security mechanisms, such as declassification via encrypted
communication channels, such conflicts can be resolved, as
we further discuss in Section IV-F.
IV. POLICY COMPLIANT FLOWS
Given the policy constraints and security labels, we intro-
duce optimization models to compute a flow-rule-based net-
work configuration under consideration of policy compliance
and resource availability. We first introduce an integer linear
programming (ILP) model to maximize the number of flows
strictly satisfying all security constraints. If no path meeting
the required security constraints can be found for a flow f , the
model will suggest to drop f . Further, we propose a second
ILP-based optimization model which minimizes the sum of
policy conflict values, given a topology and security labels,
under the assumption that all flows f ∈ F permitted by the
access control constraint must be accommodated.
A. Policy Compliant Flow Maximization Problem
In this section, we introduce an ILP to maximize the number
of flows that can be accommodated by a network under
consideration of capacity and security constraints. We refer
to this problem as the policy compliant flow maximization
problem, and formulate the constraints in (7). The optimization
model shown determines if a network configuration fulfilling
the defined security policy can be found to route the flows F
between the subjects S and objects O. To compute a path, we
first introduce a binary decision variable xfij to indicate if link
(i, j) ∈ E is used on the path for flow f (i.e., xfij = 1) or not
(i.e., xfij = 0). To decide if a flow f can be accommodated,
we also introduce the binary decision variable αf .
In 7b, we add αf to the link indication variable xfis to
trigger a flow f at a subject s. To compute a path between the
subject node s and object node o, a flow f is consumed at a
node o, as stated in constraint 7c, by subtracting αf from the
link indication variable. In 7d, we state the flow preservation
constraint to ensure that the sum of incoming flows into a node
equals the sum of outgoing flows of a node.
max
∑
f∈F
αf (7a)
s.t.∑
i:(i,s)∈E
xfis + α
f =
∑
j:(s,j)∈E
xfsj , ∀f ∈ F
(7b)∑
j:(o,j)∈E
xfoj − αf = 0, ∀f ∈ F
(7c)∑
i,j∈E
xfij =
∑
j,k∈E
xfjk, ∀f ∈ F
(7d)∑
i:(i,j)∈E
xfij ≤ 1, ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ V
(7e)∑
f∈F
xfij · df ≤ κij , ∀(i, j) ∈ E
(7f)
αf · lev(σo, σs) = αf , ∀o(f) ∈ O, s(f) ∈ S, f ∈ F
(7g)
αf · cat(λco, λcs) = αf ,
∀o(f) ∈ O, s(f) ∈ S, c ∈ C, f ∈ F
(7h)
xfij · orig(σo, σs) ≤ xfij · σj ,
∀(i, j) ∈ E, o(f) ∈ O, s(f) ∈ S, f ∈ F
(7i)
xfij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, f ∈ F
αf ∈ {0, 1}, ∀f ∈ F
We add constraint 7e to limit the number of visits of a
node to one for each flow. Constraint 7f ensures that the given
capacity κij of a link (i, j) ∈ E is not exceeded for forwarding
flows over a link i, j with a size of df per flow. Typically, in
bidirectional communication in computer networks the size of
5
the request flow is different than the size of the reply flow.
Since we assume symmetric routes, the flow size variable
df should be chosen to account for the flow size in both
directions. Additionally, since new flow demands typically
arrive at different times in a network, we can replace the above
link capacity κij with the residual capacity κ˜ij which states
the remaining capacity on a link (i, j) ∈ E considering the
existing flows in a network traversing link (i, j).
In constraints 7g and 7h, we define the access control
properties. Constraint 7g ensures that a flow f between a
subject s and an object o is only permitted if the function
lev(σo, σs), shown in (8), returns 1, indicating that the security
levels of s and o allow communication:
lev(σo, σs) =

1, if o is provider object and σo ≤ σs
1, if o is receiver object and σo ≥ σs
1, if o is both and σo = σs
0, otherwise
(8)
As defined in Section III-C for access control, we further
have to ensure that the subject s and object o have the
appropriate security categories before calculating a path. In
function cat(λco, λ
c
s) shown in (9), we model the requirement
of security categories to allow a flow between s and o:
cat(λco, λ
c
s) =

1− (λco − λco · λcs), if o is provider
1− (λcs − λcs · λco), if o is receiver
1− (λcs − λco) · (λcs − λco), if o is both
0, otherwise
(9)
To mathematically define this, we introduce variable λci which
indicates if a node i has a security category c, i.e., λci =
1, or not, i.e., λci = 0. As an example for the operation of
function cat(), suppose a subject s wants to communicate with
a provider object o. In order to permit the flow, the constraint
that Co ⊆ Cs must be satisfied. To evaluate if the security
categories Co of an object are a subset of the categories in
Cs, we introduce the formulation 1− (λco− λco · λcs) as shown
in (9). This will evaluate to 0 if subject s does not have a
security category c, but object o does, i.e., (1−(1−1 ·0)) = 0.
Such a case does not fulfill the access control constraint, and
therefore the flow cannot be admitted, i.e., αf = 0.
Function cat() works in a similar way if o is a receiver
object. In case o is both a provider and receiver, function
cat() evaluates to 1 if Co = Cs. As stated in constraint 7h,
the function cat() has to return 1 for all categories c ∈ C
for a flow f between a subject s(f) ∈ S and an object node
o(f) ∈ O. Additionally, in constraint 7i, we define the secure
flow property to prevent information flow to lower classified
nodes. Thus, for each next node j on a link (i, j) of a flow
f , indicated by the decision variable xfij , the security class
of the originating node of flow f (i.e., the subject if the
object is a receiver, and the object otherwise) has to be less or
equal to the security class at the next node j on the path. We
define function orig(σo, σs) as shown in (10), where orig()
returns the security level depending on the type of object
node o, according to the defined flow control constraint in
Algorithm 1 PolicyCompliantPath(G,s,o,df )
1: V = nodes in G
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: dist[v] = infinity, prev[v] = null
4: end for
5: dist[s] = 0
6: N = nodes in G
7: if lev(σo, σs) = 1 and cat(λco, λcs) = 1,∀λco ∈ Co, λcs ∈
Cs then
8: while N not empty do
9: i = node in N with smallest dist[]
10: remove i from N
11: for all adjacent node j of i do
12: if orig(σo, σs) ≤ σj and df ≤ κ˜ij then
13: distnew = dist[i] + 1
14: if distnew ≤ dist[j] then
15: dist[j] = distnew
16: prev[j] = i
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end while
21: end if
22: return prev
Section III-C:
orig(σo, σs) =
{
σs, if o is receiver
σo, otherwise
(10)
This last constraint ensures that on a path between a subject
s and an object node o, no forwarding nodes with a lower
security level compared to the security level of the originating
node of the flow are visited. We then use the specified con-
straints 7b-7i as the basis for our heuristic-based maximization
algorithm discussed in the next section.
B. Policy Compliant Flow Maximization Algorithm
The linear programming model introduced in Section IV-A
is a binary integer programming model, a special case of
integer linear programming (ILP) since all variables are binary.
Integer linear programming models are NP-hard problems in
general, and the special case of binary integer programming
is one of Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [24]. Although
solvers such as Gurobi [25] are efficient in computing a so-
lution for such problems, binary integer programming models
can be impractical to solve for certain inputs.
To address this issue, we also formulate a heuristic algo-
rithm to compute a security compliant path between subjects
and objects based on a modification of Djikstra’s shortest path
algorithm. Algorithm 1 is a modification of Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm where we add the access control and secure
flow control constraints, similar to the constraints presented
in (7). Specifically, we formulate the access control constraint
in line 7 based on the introduced functions lev() as defined
in (8) and cat() as defined in (9). To compute a secure path
between s and o we define the constraints in line 12 to only
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consider an adjacent node j of a link if the security level of
node j is greater or equal the security level of the originating
node of flow f and the link connecting node i and j has
enough residual capacity to accommodate flow f . In effect,
the introduced model and algorithm will compute paths that
accommodate the maximum number of flows f ∈ F between
a subject node s and an object node o, with consideration for
security and link capacity.
C. Policy Conflict Minimization Model
Finding a path fulfilling all security conditions might not
always be possible considering the nature of real-world net-
works. In contrast to the previous model, here we assume
that all flows fulfilling the access control and link capacity
constraints must be accommodated in the network, which may
lead to policy conflicts. Policy conflicts are conditions where a
flow is visiting a node on a path that has a lower security level
than the transferred information (i.e., than the sender node),
and we quantify a policy conflict as the numerical difference
between those security levels. Considering the lattice in Sec-
tion III-B, we assume that nodes classified as Confidential
(2) have a higher risk of being compromised than nodes
classified as Secret (3). The goal here is to minimize policy
conflicts; therefore, if information classified as Top Secret (4)
is transferred on a path with policy conflicts, it is preferable
to select nodes with the smallest numerical difference (i.e.,
Secret (3) nodes are preferred over Confidential (2) nodes).
Resolving policy conflicts requires additional security mea-
sures (e.g., declassification). The larger a policy conflict (i.e.,
higher numerical difference in security levels), the more an
additional security measure will cost, in terms of transmission
time or computation overhead. By minimizing the numerical
distance of policy conflicts, we aim to minimize the cost
required to apply additional security measures to meet a
defined security policy.
To achieve this, we compute a network configuration in
a two-step process. We first select a subset of the flows
Fl ⊆ F that fulfill the access control constraints, and second,
compute paths between subjects and objects with the objective
to minimize security policy conflicts. We define the access
control constraints as follows:
Fl ={f ∈ F : lev(σo, σs) = 1 and cat(λco, λcs) = 1,
∀λco ∈ Co,∀λcs ∈ Cs, o ∈ O, s ∈ S}
(11)
Next, for the set of legitimate flows Fl, we also define an
objective function, conf, to find a network configuration that
accommodates all flows in Fl while minimizing the policy
conflicts on a path of a flow f ∈ Fl between a subject s
and an object o. The function returns the difference between
the security level of the flow’s originating node, given by
orig(σo, σs), and the security level σj of a node j on the
path between s and o if σj < orig(σo, σs). More formally:
conf(σo, σs, σj) =
{
orig(σo, σs)− σj , if σj < orig(σo, σs)
0, otherwise
(12)
We aim to minimize the policy conflicts caused by visited
nodes with lower security levels. Assuming a flow originates
Fig. 3. Path selection based on security levels.
from a node o, we define the severity of the policy conflict by
the numerical distance from level σo of node o to a node j with
level σj , if σj < σo. Then, choosing a node j over a node h,
where (σo−σj) < (σo−σh), is preferable. And for selecting a
secure path, we want to give preference to these nodes with a
smaller difference in security level with the originating node,
even if such a path is significantly longer than the shortest
path. To model this, we introduce a factor γ and define our
objective function as follows:
min
∑
f∈Fl
∑
i,j∈E
xfij · γconf(σo(f),σs(f),σj) (13)
In (13), xfij denotes the decision variable if link (i, j) is
selected as part of the path between s and o for a flow f .
In the objective function as shown in (13), σo(f) denotes the
security level of object node o of a flow f , σs(f) denotes the
security level of subject node s of a flow f . The security level
of a node j on the path between s and o is defined by σj . The
factor γ controls the length of a path that should be chosen as
a trade-off for visiting nodes with a smaller distance in terms
of security levels. We visualize this in an example shown in
Figure 3.
Considering this small network, two possible paths exist
between s and o. The numbers in the nodes indicate their
security level. If we select a factor γ = 4, the top path results
in a value of 44−2 = 16, while the bottom path has a smaller
policy conflict value of 3 · 44−3 = 12, and thus would be
selected. In contrast, if we select a smaller value for γ (e.g.,
γ = 2) then considering the top path, a transition from the
node with security level 4 to the node with security level 2
has to be made, resulting in a policy conflict value of 24−2 =
4. Computing the policy conflict value for the bottom path
would result in 3 · 24−3 = 6, since we have to visit three
nodes with a difference in the security level of 1. Based on
this, the top path would be selected, although from a security
perspective, the bottom path may be more preferable since
nodes with a smaller security level difference are visited. This
example shows that the factor γ controls the selection of longer
paths visiting nodes with a smaller security level difference. To
always select paths with the smallest security level difference,
γ can be set to the network diameter + 1, in terms of hop
count, which we prove as follows.
Lemma 1. To select a longer path with lower policy conflicts,
we must set γ to the maximum path length + 1.
Proof. Assuming a flow originating from an object o, we
have to show that for a path of flow f defined by a set of
links (i, j) ∈ E indicated by the decision variable xfij , the
value of policy conflicts specified as
∑
i,j∈E x
f
ij · γσo−σj and
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assuming that ∀j, σj < σo, is larger for a path with higher
policy conflicts than a potentially longer path with a lower
conflict value if γ is chosen appropriately. Given a candidate
node for the path of flow f with a policy conflict of a, we
want to choose γ so that a potentially longer path y over a
set of nodes with a lower policy conflict of b is selected, i.e.,
γa > y · γb. Since a > b, we can express b as a− q, where q
is the numerical difference of the security levels of a and b,
i.e., q = a − b. By replacing b with a − q, we can write the
inequality above as γa · γq > y · γa. Assuming the smallest
absolute difference of two unequal security classes, i.e., q = 1,
the inequality above can be written as γ > y. Therefore, we
can say that in order to select a path that is y hops longer,
over a set of nodes with a lower policy conflict value, we have
to select a value for γ that is at least y + 1. This also holds
for larger security differences, since γq < γq+1 holds true for
positive values of q.
D. Policy Conflict Minimization Problem
To minimize the policy conflicts on a path, we formulate the
optimization problem as an integer linear programming (ILP)
model. We refer to this problem as the security policy conflict
minimization problem, as shown in (14).
To trigger a flow at a node s, 14b adds 1 to the decision
variable xfis. In our formulation to compute a path from s to
o, the flow is consumed at node o as stated in constraint 14c.
In 14d, we state the flow preservation constraint to ensure
that the sum of incoming flows to a node equals the sum of
outgoing flows. Constraint 14e ensures that the given capacity
κij of a link (i, j) ∈ E is not exceeded by forwarding flows
f ∈ Fl with a size of df per flow. In 14e, we assume that
the flow size df is chosen to include traffic between s and o
in both directions since we assume symmetric routes. Since
new flow demands typically arrive at different times in a
network, we can replace the above link capacity κij with the
residual capacity κ˜ij which states the remaining capacity on
a link (i, j) ∈ E considering the existing flows traversing link
(i, j). Accordingly, with the specified constraints 14b-14e, the
introduced model will compute a path for every flow f ∈ Fl
between a subject node s(f) and an object node o(f) with the
objective function as defined in 14a.
min
∑
f∈Fl
∑
i,j∈E
xfij · γconf(σo(f),σs(f),σj) (14a)
s.t.∑
i:(i,s)∈E
xfis + 1 =
∑
j:(s,j)∈E
xfsj , ∀f ∈ Fl (14b)∑
j:(o,j)∈E
xfoj − 1 = 0, ∀f ∈ Fl (14c)∑
i,j∈E
xfij =
∑
j,k∈E
xfjk, ∀f ∈ Fl (14d)∑
f∈Fl
xfij · df ≤ κij , ∀(i, j) ∈ E (14e)
xfij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, f ∈ Fl
E. Policy Conflict Minimization Algorithm
As discussed in Section IV-B, ILP models with binary
integer variables, such as (14), are typically NP-hard and can
Algorithm 2 MinConflictPath(G,s,o,df )
1: V = nodes in G
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: conf [v] = infinity, prev[v] = null
4: end for
5: conf [s] = 0, N = nodes in G
6: if lev(σo, σs) = 1 and cat(λco, λcs) = 1,∀λco ∈ Co, λcs ∈
Cs then
7: while N not empty do
8: i = node in N with smallest conf []
9: remove i from N
10: for all adjacent node j of i do
11: if df ≤ κ˜ij then
12: confnew = conf [j] + γconf(σo,σs,σj)
13: if confnew ≤ conf [j] then
14: conf [j] = confnew
15: prev[j] = i
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: end if
21: return prev
be impractical to solve for certain input sequences. To address
this, we also propose a heuristic algorithm to approximate an
optimal solution and replace the objective to find the shortest
path with the objective to compute a path with the smallest
sum of policy conflict values (Algorithm 2, lines 12-13).
Since Algorithms 1 and 2 are based on Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm, we can express their time complexity as
O(|F | · (|E|+ |V |log|V |)) for a number of |F | flows.
F. Resolving Policy Conflicts
As we’ve shown in the previous section, paths with suffi-
cient security levels and capacity may not always exist for two
nodes permitted to communicate. In such a case, additional
security mechanisms must be applied on the flow in order to be
policy compliant. These mechanisms typically involve a cost
to implement (e.g., increased transmission delay, processing
time, or capacity), which the latter model aims to minimize.
An important mechanism for resolving policy conflicts is
declassification, which is the process of lowering the security
level of the information. Sabelfeld et al. [26] discuss a general
framework for declassification by defining the dimensions of
information release, including: what information is released,
who releases the information, where information is released,
and when it is released. By analyzing these dimensions,
a network operator is then able to evaluate the risks and
benefits of declassification to resolve certain security policy
conflicts. In our framework, declassification can involve low-
ering a flow’s security level so it can traverse a path with
lower classified nodes than the originating node. Methods
to achieve this include traffic camouflaging techniques [27]
or VPNs to defend against traffic analysis. Resolving policy
conflicts can also be achieved by the NSO relabeling certain
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nodes in the network (e.g., increasing the security level of
forwarding nodes) after upgrading the security measures on
a switch and re-evaluating its security level. Our proposed
optimization model to minimize policy conflicts will point out
exactly which components of the network topology are causing
conflicts; therefore, relabeling of nodes can be a permanent
solution to policy conflicts which may reoccur.
V. SECURE FLOW RULE CONSTRUCTION
To realize a policy compliant network configuration, in the
following we define a set of principles for the construction of
secure flow rules which preserve confidentiality.
A. Isolating Flows
Attacks that exploit the composition of flow rules are
effective because the matching criteria often only identifies
packets by a limited set of header fields, as discussed by
Achleitner et al. [14]. If the flow rules are only matching
packets against header fields of a certain network layer (e.g., IP
addresses), then the information in other layers will be seen as
”wild cards” and thus will be ignored. This problem motivates
the construction of SDN flow rules with consideration of
information spanning all network layers.
The OpenFlow protocol [22] defines a set of matching fields
supporting different network layers. Multiple endpoints may
share lower layer fields such as physical ingress port; thus,
to differentiate them and identify their security levels, we
must include fields from higher network layers (e.g., IP or
Ethernet addresses). But security leaks caused by the exchange
of certain packet types in SDN-enabled networks [9], [11],
[14] motivate the use of categories in a security lattice to offer
finer granularity of information exchange in SDN flow rules.
Therefore, we derive these categories from additional packet
header fields (e.g., ARP , IP , TCP , UDP and ICMP ), and
use them in enforcing the security policy.
Additionally, with this general framework, a security cate-
gory can be defined with even finer granularity. For example,
by specifying field subtypes: ICMP type 8 code 0, to allow
ping packets. Thus, the various header fields allow greater
flexibility when defining the security policy, and unlike tra-
ditional networks, the policy can be efficiently managed by
sending flow mod messages to the forwarding nodes to update
their routing tables.
B. Constructing Secure Flow Rules
In SDN-enabled networks, we must consider the assigned
security labels during the construction of flow rules at the
controller. As described previously, security leaks can arise
with imprecise matching criteria. Considering this, we must
construct precise flow rules which ensure that only packets
fulfilling the defined security level and category constraints can
be transmitted. More formally, for secure rule construction, we
represent the set of fields supported for network layer Ni ∈ N ,
where N is the set of all network layers, as RNi. Then, the
superset of fields to be matched against some packet P during
Algorithm 3 GenerateFlowRule(R,A,P ,next)
1: rule.append(”match : ”)
2: for all r ∈ R do
3: if r ∈ P then
4: rule.append(r = P (r))
5: end if
6: end for
7: rule.append(”action : ”)
8: if next != drop then
9: for all a ∈ A do
10: rule.append(a)
11: end for
12: rule.append(”next”)
13: else
14: rule.append(”drop”)
15: end if
16: return rule
secure rule construction can be realized by taking the union
of sets, which we denote as R:
R =
⋃
Ni∈N :∀Ni≤NP
RNi (15)
This formulation ensures that—after satisfying access control
constraints—a flow is isolated and handled correctly according
to its security categories (i.e., packet fields).
Besides matching criteria, OpenFlow also defines action
sets, specifying what actions to apply on matched packets.
These include a required action part (e.g., forwarding or
dropping) and optional actions (e.g., rewriting packet header
fields). We denote the required action part as next, which
specifies to either send a packet to a specific output port or to
drop it. Similarly, we specify the set of optional actions, such
as rewriting addresses, as the action set A.
Based on sets R and A for a packet P , we formulate Algo-
rithm 3. We begin rule construction by defining the matching
part of a flow rule in line 1. We continue to iterate through
the set of matching fields in R, as defined in Equation 15, and
check in line 3 if a specified field r can be applied to a value
in packet P . If this evaluates to true, we add the matching
field r and its associated value P (r) to the flow rule in line 4.
In line 7, we add the action part of a flow rule and check in
line 8 if the action is to drop the packet. In case we specify
a rule to drop packets of a flow with specific protocol types,
it must be ensured that the priority of that rule is higher than
other rules for the flow which may allow forwarding for other
protocol types (i.e., allowing most IP traffic, but disallowing
any UDP over IP).
To resolve any flow rule conflicts between rule actions,
we refer to existing frameworks such as Porras et al. [12].
Nonetheless, if the packet is forwarded, then the set of action
fields and the output port are added to the rule, as shown in
lines 10 and 12. With this construction, we are able to properly
generate a secure flow rule configuration and isolate the flows
to ensure that confidentiality of information flow is preserved
in the network.
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VI. EVALUATION
With an MLS policy, adversarial capabilities (in terms of
probing, eavesdropping, and lateral movement) are by def-
inition restricted to only that allowed by policy. Here, we
still want to be able to route all legitimate flows. In the
following, we demonstrate that (in comparison to not enforcing
a security policy) a network administrator can still provide
strong coverage of network flows. The goal of our approach is
to achieve this, while also reducing the security cost associated
with guaranteeing all flows be routed. In Table III, we report
on the performance of our framework to find policy compliant
paths for flows in various topologies and with lattices of
different sizes. In Table IV, we report MLSNet’s performance
when minimizing the policy conflicts, where accommodating
the remaining flows may require routing along paths con-
taining nodes with a lower security-level than required. We
further show MLSNet’s ability to mitigate common attacks
(see Section II-B), such as those executed by the recently
proposed reconnaissance tool SDNMap [28], [14].
A. Accommodating Network Flows
To evaluate the ability of our framework to maximize the
number of policy compliant flows and minimize policy con-
flicts on paths, we test the introduced linear programming (LP)
models and heuristic algorithms (HA) on different network
topologies. We first consider a realistic autonomous system
(AS) network topology. Then, to model common data-center
and cloud topologies, we consider different k-ary fat-tree
networks [29], where k is the port density of each switch in
the network (e.g., 8, 12, and 16 ports). We consider lattices of
2-4 security levels which are evenly distributed and randomly
assigned to the nodes in a network. To generate flows, we
randomly pick source and destination node pairs which fulfill
the access control constraint and compute paths with our
linear program models and heuristic algorithms. Further, we
consider networks with different link capacities to simulate
congestion. Our results for flow maximization and policy
conflict minimization (for the remaining flows) are averaged
over several runs and shown in Tables III and IV.
We explore the number of flows able to be routed in the
AS3257 Rocketfuel [30] topology (161 nodes, 656 links), as
well as 8-ary (208 nodes, 384 links), 12-ary (612 nodes, 1296
links), and 16-ary (1344 nodes, 3072 links) fat-tree networks.
For flow maximization, shown in Table III, our framework
shows that a majority of flows was always routed securely. For
any of the topologies, the number of flows routed reached, at a
maximum, approximately 85% coverage. We also observe, for
any of the topologies, that the number of flows routed securely
decreases as the number of security levels increases (from
left to right in any row). However, even at 4 security levels
(common in military networks), a majority of flows was routed
securely in the noncongested network. Certainly, congestion
dynamics (here, randomly chosen), node labels (here, random),
and the different traffic types vary with different networks and
will affect the number of flows able to be routed, although
this situation can be remedied with conflict minimization.
Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that the framework is in
fact feasible in several network topologies of different sizes.
In the case of congested networks, we observe that the linear
programming models show slightly better performance in
terms of flow assignment compared to the heuristic algorithms.
We note that despite the low flow coverage (∼ 50%) because
new flows could not be supported by the links at some specific
time, rules may still have a scheduled install at a delayed time
(i.e., when the links can support the new flows), so permitted
flows do not necessarily have to be discarded.
The key insight here is that the randomness used in generat-
ing the networks did not hinder the flow coverage. Specifically,
in real data-center or cloud networks, edge switches may
carry similar traffic [31] and thus have similar security levels
and only be limited by the available capacity (i.e., not the
security levels). These results show that even in the worst case
of random level assignment—where for example higher-level
nodes may be surrounded by lower-level ones and thus cannot
communicate without a policy conflict—paths (even if longer)
can be found for a majority of flows.
Given that a majority of flows can be routed according to
policy, we evaluate our model’s ability to route the remaining
flows (in the noncongested case) to guarantee availability.
Table IV shows that all flows can be routed with minimal
policy conflict along the allowed path. We define policy
conflicts as the scenario where a node is visited on a flow path
that has a lower security level than the transferred information
(i.e., the originating node), and quantify it as the difference of
the security levels. Minimizing the conflicts also minimizes
the additional security measures needed to protect the flows
traversing unsafe links (e.g., via stronger encryption).
For the AS network, paths with no conflict can be found
for the majority of flows, while most of the remaining flows
only impose a conflict of one security level difference. Less
than 5% of flows must be routed through even less secure
paths in order to guarantee availability. The case is similar
for the fat-tree networks; the majority of flow paths have no
conflict, approximately 20− 30% of flows can be routed with
minimal policy conflict of one level, while feasible paths for
the remaining flows can also be found, fitting as many flows
along two-level difference paths, and so forth. The key insight
here is that most of the remaining flows were able to be routed
with a conflict of one security level difference. Investigating
the reasons behind this is an interesting direction for future
work, where it may be possible to identify whether or not
this conflict occurs at hot (or commonly used) nodes, and
whether that information can be used to relabel nodes (and
perhaps repurpose them) or physically reconfigure the network
to reduce possible conflicts to a minimum, for any set of flows.
We observe that the execution time of computing secure
paths is strongly correlated with the number of switches in
the network, scaling exponentially. We find that both the LP
solver (Gurobi [25]) and the greedy algorithms can quickly
compute the paths for a few hundred flows in a 8-ary tree on
average between 0.5s to 1s in a Python-based implementation.
When routing thousands of flows for the same network, the
execution time can increase to between 7-8s, where the greedy
algorithm performs faster (approximately 3.5-4s) as the num-
ber of flows increases further. However, large data-centers may
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TABLE III
FLOW MAXIMIZATION BENCHMARK.
AS network k=8 k=12 k=16
# Lattice Levels 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev.
LP (no congestion) 85% 75% 65.7% 79.5% 64.6% 58.3% 79.5% 66.6% 59% 81% 68.4% 64%
HA (no congestion) 79.6% 71% 63.1% 63% 52% 50.6% 66.5% 57% 51.1% 68.5% 61.1% 53%
LP (cong. network) 53.4% 45.2% 37.4% 45.5% 39.3% 34.3% 56% 46.5% 36.5% 56% 50.6% 36.5%
HA (cong. network) 51.9% 41.8% 35.8% 44.5% 33.5% 31.9% 50% 38% 32.3% 52.3% 45.8% 34.5%
TABLE IV
POLICY CONFLICT MINIMIZATION BENCHMARK.
AS network k=8 k=12 k=16
# Lattice Levels 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev. 2 lev. 3 lev. 4 lev.
LP no conflict 85% 75% 65.7% 79.5% 64.6% 58.3% 79.5% 66.6% 59% 81% 68.4% 64%
1 lev. diff. 15% 21.5% 29.3% 20.5% 24.6% 24% 20.5% 26% 28.5% 19% 22% 20%
2 lev. diff. - 3.5% 4.3% - 10.8% 12.7% - 7.4% 10% - 9.6% 11%
3 lev. diff. - - 0.7% - - 5% - - 2.5% - - 5%
HA no conflict 79.6% 71% 63.1% 63% 52% 50.6% 66.5% 57% 51.1% 68.5% 61.1% 53%
1 lev. diff. 20.4% 21.5% 24.6% 37% 25.7% 22.1% 33.5% 29% 27.5% 31.5% 23.2% 23%
2 lev. diff. - 7.5% 6.6% - 22.3% 22.6% - 14% 14.7% - 15.7% 14%
3 lev. diff. - - 5.7% - - 4.7% - - 6.7% - - 10%
be composed of tens of thousands of nodes [29], and even mid-
sized data-centers may contain several hundred or up to one-
thousand nodes. In the latter case (for example, represented
by a 16-ary fat-tree), solving the optimization can take nearly
45s. In enterprise-grade networks, the computation speed of
MLSNet can be further improved by applying buffering of
precomputed paths, implementation on hardware, or clustering
of flows which is especially applicable in fat-tree networks.
Overall, the results show strong evidence for the ability of
our framework to accommodate flows in real networks, while
preserving confidentiality of information flow.
B. Defending Against Attacks
We then implement the network scenario shown in Figure 4
with the SDN simulator Mininet [32], assigning security labels
to the nodes and configuring the network to use our framework
MLSNet. Here, we use SDNMap [28] to demonstrate that our
framework can mitigate the attack techniques discussed in
Section II-B. SDNMap operates by iteratively probing net-
work nodes with crafted packets and eavesdropping on reply
messages from all endpoints in the network to reconstruct
flow rules (identify active hosts and supported protocols). The
gathered information is then used to exploit flow rules and
bypass security measures such as access-control lists.
Here, we use the security lattice from Figure 2 to config-
ure the network. Running the MLSNet system at the SDN
controller, we assign the security classification of Public -
[ARP,IP,TCP] to the adversary node at 10.0.0.1 (who is using
SDNMap). We then let the adversary begin sending probes
into the network. The switch default action for an unknown
flow is to send it to the controller for inspection and flow rule
generation. On receipt of a new flow, the controller will verify
the access control constraint of the communicating parties and
the flow control constraint of nodes along a potential flow path.
A secure flow rule that obeys the security policy will then be
generated.
Mitigating lateral movement. MLSNet ensures that a node
with this classification cannot receive packets from nodes
with a higher classification (e.g., from the node at 10.0.0.4
labeled Secret - [ARP,ICMP,IP,TCP,UDP]). Therefore, all of
the probes destined from the attacker toward a node of higher
level should be blocked at the controller, and any induced
responses (e.g., from ARP) should also be blocked from
flowing back toward the attacker, with no flow rules being
generated. We observed exactly this behavior after scanning
the network’s IP space. The attacker sent out a series of probes
enumerating the packet fields (e.g., IP addresses and protocols)
to identify active hosts and supported protocols. However, all
of the probes sent toward nodes of higher classification were
blocked by the controller for not satisfying the access control
constraint. Here, SDNMap reported that only the node with
IP address 10.0.0.5 replied (the other public host). Although
present in the network, the remaining hosts, 10.0.0.4 and
10.0.0.6, are not discovered by the attacker.
Further, any induced responses over different protocols such
as UDP or ICMP were blocked at the controller for not
satisfying the flow control constraint as well. Therefore, the
attacker could not obtain any other information about the other
hosts or protocols supported by them, and their capabilities
were only limited to scanning public nodes over the protocols
allowed by the defined security label (here, ARP, IP, and TCP).
Indeed, future work may investigate optimal labeling and
relabeling strategies that can respond to the current network
traffic profile in order to dynamically enforce least-privilege
and further reduce the threat surface.
Mitigating packet spoofing. With respect to packet spoof-
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Fig. 4. Network scenario with security labels.
ing, we observe that MLSNet can significantly reduce the
threat surface. SDNMap reports that it is not able to spoof
IP addresses from hosts which can’t be discovered, since
our framework will prevent the deployment of a rule for an
unrecognized node, and therefore additional flow rule features
cannot be reconstructed. By including information from all
network layers (as discussed in Section V) and deploying rules
that only allow flows according to the given policy, we are able
to prevent attacks resulting from these forms of spoofing.
Although, we note again that MLS cannot detect all forms
of packet spoofing, and we rely on other SDN-based defenses
to detect packet spoofing of existing nodes or against the
topology discovery service [9]. Despite this, it can mitigate
the threat of data exfiltration from packet spoofing with secure
routing paths. For example, consider a compromised node with
a lower security level (e.g., public) spoofing a node of higher
level (e.g., top-secret) to communicate with another top-secret
node, but through two other public nodes. The adversary would
have to compromise both public nodes in between in order for
them to actually forward the top-secret flow—as it is against
security policy.
Mitigating eavesdropping. In addition to mitigating the
threat of lateral movement, MLSNet also prevents the attacker
from eavesdropping on communication between nodes of
higher-classification. Since the controller prevents flow rules
that direct higher-level traffic toward public nodes from being
generated, the attacker was unable to capture any traffic
passing between the secret and confidential nodes at 10.0.0.4
and 10.0.0.6. Further, any responses induced from the probes
were also blocked from generating a new flow rule to direct
traffic toward the attacker, preventing eavesdropping. As a
result, MLSNet is able to significantly limit the ability of
SDNMap to reconstruct flow rules.
VII. RELATED WORK
Historically, networks have enforced security policies (i.e.,
information flow) through firewall and routing configuration.
However, these mechanisms are often very coarse and prone
to ambiguity, errors, and require coordination across many
devices [33], [34], [3]. Indeed, failures due to errors have
enabled a variety of attacks to be launched against real-world
networks, including device impersonation, man-in-the-middle,
and denial-of-service [35], [36], [37]. Typically these attacks
manifest from a small set of techniques: packet spoofing,
lateral movement, and eavesdropping, which have been well-
known problems since the 90s [38] and have become increas-
ingly important as more information is being put online [39].
In fact, recent work has already demonstrated the ability of
an adversary to freely probe within the network to recover
sensitive information [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], including
active network hosts and even switch flow table rules in
software-defined networks [14].
Over time, there have been many defense methods pro-
posed against these techniques, including: source validation to
prevent or mitigate packet spoofing [19], [20], firewalling to
enforce access policies at network boundaries [3], encryption
to prevent unauthorized parties from intelligibly interpreting
sniffed data, among others. While each useful in a variety
of scenarios, they target specific attack techniques and only
partially address the problem of confidentiality—ensuring
that only authorized entities have access to some data. This
motivates our work for developing a solution to combine
the benefits offered by each of these methods. We exploit
multilevel security to accomplish this, providing guarantees
about who in the network may access what data.
Multilevel security allows a network administrator to specify
an hierarchical access control policy of a set of subjects on a
set of objects. With labels (i.e., a level and categories) given
to each subject and object, the policy is enforced through
access and flow-control constraints. In fact, multilevel security
already plays a critical role in controlling access to information
for both military personnel and employees of commercial
businesses with different levels of clearance [5]. Common
use cases include controlling file access in an operating
system [6], object access in generic storage systems [40], table
access in a relational database [7], as well as a primitive for
securing information flow between variables in programming
languages [41].
The notion of multilevel security can also be applied to
computer networks, where the MLS policy dictates which
nodes are allowed to communicate, what type of traffic they
may exchange, and what paths the flows may take in the
network. This property precisely address the concerns about
confidentiality. We draw inspiration for our framework from
the seminal work by Lu et al. [8] and apply it to SDN-enabled
networks. In their work, they introduce a model for multilevel
security (MLS) in computer networks by defining a Trusted
Network Base (TNB) that is similar to a Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) in single-computer systems. The proposed model
defines a set of entities (e.g., terminals or printers) and users
of the network and relies on the implementation of a security
policy by the network endpoints. This approach becomes
impractical when having to deploy it on every node in the
network, and we exploit the centralization of software-defined
networking (SDN) [42] to provide this service transparently
to the entire network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose MLSNet, a framework which can
efficiently enforce an MLS policy by generating secure flow-
rule configurations. Built upon access control and flow control
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constraints, we develop models and heuristic algorithms to
compute policy compliant configurations according to two
goals: satisfying a strict flow policy and a soft policy. For
the deployment of a policy compliant network configuration,
we define principles for secure flow rule construction. We
then demonstrate that our framework can deploy network
configurations able to withstand recently identified attacks on
SDNs. We hope this framework will serve as a base for further
investigation into defenses which protect the network with a
broader scope than specific attacks and efficient mechanisms
for resolving policy conflicts in real-time.
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